RECIPES FOR ATTENTION ONLINE APPENDIX

Elliott, Thomas, Edwin Amenta, and Neal Caren. 2016. "Recipes for Attention: Policy Reforms, Crises, Organizational Characteristics, and the Newspaper Coverage of the LGBT Movement, 1969-2009." *Sociological Forum*.

This online supplement presents additional information about the calibration of the policy score measure, as well as additional fsQCA analyses we performed, primarily for robustness checks. Specifically, the supplement includes the following fsQCA analyses: the analysis of remainder rows; the complex solution for our original results; a description of a weighted coverage score and the results of an analyses using this score as the outcome set; results using an alternative frequency threshold; results using an alternative consistency threshold; results after removing inactive organizations from the analysis; and results with adjusted outcome set calibrations for the twenty-first century, given the cutbacks in newspapers. These analyses show that the three recipes presented in Table 2 are extremely robust.

1. Political Score Construction

To construct the policy measure based on political mediation thinking, we first identified all major gay-related policy reforms, including court cases. For legislative policies, we used accounts and timelines of the gay and lesbian movement by scholars (Kranz and Cusick, 2005) and SMOs (HRC, 2009; NGLTF, 2009, 2012), as well as data from the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 2012). We used Kane's (Kane, 2003, 2007) data on sodomy law changes. For court decisions, we relied on Pinello's (Pinello, 2003) list of important gay rights cases and supplemented it with a timeline of important gay rights cases published by the HRC (2006). We included all federal legislation that became law, all Presidential executive orders, and all U.S. Supreme Court cases that were relevant to gay issues. We included any federal circuit court decisions and state supreme (or highest) court decisions

Date: July 13, 2016.

that represented a substantive policy change. For example, cases in which the judges upheld the constitutionality of existing law were not included, but cases in which laws were overturned or reinterpreted substantially were included. We argue these cases are less likely to be considered important defeats by the national movement. We only include the final decision in a case's procedural history, so if a case makes its way through the state's highest court, the federal court of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court, only the Supreme Court's decision is counted. State legislation was included only when it produced a novel policy reform. For example, Illinois was the first state to repeal its sodomy laws in 1961 and is included in our counts, whereas subsequent legislative sodomy law repeals are not. However, we do count New York's sodomy law repeal in 1980 as it was the first state to repeal through the courts. We treat state level non-discrimination legislation and hate crimes laws similarly. We argue that repeated instances of the same type of policy reform will not have as big of an impact on the legitimacy and coverage of the movement as the first, so including subsequent policy reforms would artificially inflate the policy score.

We identified a total of 54 eligible policy changes and coded each for its valence (whether or not they were beneficial to the LGBT movement) and for each of eight policy domains. The policy reforms were given individual scores, with each policy gain assigned a score of 1 and each policy loss a score of -1. When the LGBT movement gains a policy advantage, the cumulative score increases by one, and when it experiences a policy disadvantage, the cumulative score decreases by one. We calculate scores for each policy domain per year, across eight domains: AIDS, discrimination, family, free speech, hate crimes, immigration, military, and sodomy. We also calculate an overall score for each year. For example, for the family policy domain, the first reform is a court case in the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) in 1989, ruling that a male couple constitutes a family for rent control purposes, increasing the domain-year from 0 to 1. Later the family policy score increases to 3, but in 1994, the Defense of Marriage Act passes, forbidding the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages and thus reducing the score from 3 to 2. The overall policy

domain scores increased from 1 to 81 by 2010, with the discrimination and family policy domains seeing the greatest gains.

An individual SMO's policy score is generated by these scores and the SMO's policy orientation. Each SMO is assigned a policy domain score: an individual domain, a general or omnibus domain, or no domain. And so each AIDS-focused SMO receives the AIDS policy domain score for a given year. This proceeds similarly across the different policy domain specialties of each SMO. An SMO with a general or omnibus policy identity is assigned the overall score. An SMO with no policy focus, or focus on a policy arena that receives no substantive policy reforms, scores zero throughout. So, for example, the Human Rights Campaign, which has a general policy focus, is assigned the overall policy score. The Family Equality Council, which focuses on family policy issues, is assigned the family policy score.

We also tried two alternative constructions of the policy score. Above, we exclude policy reforms that are not novel, so the first state to repeal sodomy is included, subsequent states are excluded. We constructed an alternative policy score in which subsequent reforms are given diminishing scores. So the first sodomy law repeal is given a value of 1, the second sodomy law repeal receives a score of 0.5, the third 0.25, and so on, which each repeal receiving half the previous score. The resulting policy scores do not differ substantially from the initial policy score, and the fsQCA results are essentially the same.

In the second alternative construction, we conceived of policy domains of being at various levels of "doneness." For example, the sodomy policy domain become "done" in 2003, when the US Supreme Court ruled all sodomy laws as unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. We constructed policy scores based on the level of "doneness" of the policy domain, varying between -100% to 100% done. The domains were simplified in this case, so that the family policy domain was based on state policies towards partner recognition (whether they had civil unions/domestic partnerships, same-sex marriage, or constitutional bans on recognition). The discrimination policy domain was based on state and federal anti-discrimination policies towards employment, for both sexual orientation and gender identity. The fsQCA results

using this construction of policy scores were again very similar to the results presented in the paper.

TABLE 1. Summary of Policy Nexus Measure with fsQCA Direct Transformation Anchors

Policy	Min	Max	N
Discrimination	-1	6	42
Family	0	4	42
Free Speech	1	3	42
Hate Crimes	0	2	42
Immigration	-1	1	42
Military	0	1	42
Sodomy	0	2	42
Schools	0	0	42
AIDS	0	1	42
All	0	19	42

2. Analyses of Remainder Rows

Since we have six causal measures, our truth table contains 26, or 64, rows. Given the large number of potential configurations, about 56 percent of these rows contain no cases and are thus designated "remainders" as we have no information about whether the configuration leads to the outcome or not.

These remainder rows can be reduced to the following Boolean combinations:
PROTEST*RESOURCES + AIDS*POLICY + AIDS*PROTEST*inclusive +
AIDS*DEATHS*resources*inclusive + aids*DEATHS*RESOURCES*inclusive +
aids*RESOURCES*policy*inclusive + PROTEST*POLICY*inclusive

None of these combinations are logically contradictory, meaning the rows are empty because we don't empirically observe a matching case, not because it is impossible to observe such a case. However, as noted in the text, there are no organizations that primarily rely on protest tactics that are also well resourced.

3. Complex Solution

The complex solution for our fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis is in Table 2. Complex solutions, unlike the intermediate solution we present, do not take into account

theoretical expectations or the lack of diversity in the data set and are not recommended for reporting (Ragin, 2008). The results include four causal pathways to high coverage (the first and second pathways combine into one in the intermediate results). The pathways include information and terms that are based in a lack of diversity in the data set: for instance, that no highly resourced organization is also protest-oriented and vice versa, and so every time "RESOURCES" appears in a solution, so does "protest-orientation," and when "PROTEST-ORIENTATION" appears in a solution so does "resources." The same thing happens with the policy and AIDS-oriented measures. Including these not-present conditions in the solutions does not add anything new to them and make them more complicated to read.

TABLE 2. Complex fsQCA Solutions for High Newspaper Coverage with Seven Causal Measures

Solution	Coverage	Consistency
aids*deaths*protest*RESOURCES*POLICY	0.104	0.874
aids*protest*RESOURCES*POLICY*INCLUSIVE	0.209	0.913
AIDS*protest*RESOURCES*policy*inclusive	0.088	0.905
AIDS*DEATHS*PROTEST*resources*policy*INCLUSIVE	0.042	0.883
Overall	0.355	0.900

4. Weighted Outcome Measure

As noted, we constructed a weighted measure of coverage that took into account some measures of the quality of coverage, including whether the organization appeared in headline, in the abstract, and whether the article appeared on the front page. We also constructed a length ratio for the article, equal to the article's word count divided by the mean word count for all articles in the analysis. Each indicator was assigned a multiplier (see Andrews and Caren, 2010). If the organization appeared in the headline, the coverage score was multiplied by 4. If the organization appeared in the abstract, the coverage score was multiplied by 2. If the article appeared on the front page, the coverage score was multiplied by 2, and finally the score was multiplied by the length ratio. The mean weighted score is 1.42, with a maximum of 24.31. Figure 1 graphs the distribution of this weighted score.

FIGURE 1. Distribution of Weighted Coverage Score



This coverage score is then summed by year and organization to construct a yearly weighted coverage score for each organization. However, as we also note, the weighted score is very highly correlated with the raw coverage score, at 0.972. Basically, this indicates that organizations were treated fairly similarly when they did appear in articles. We then used this weighted score in the same fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). We calibrated the weighted score with an lower threshold of 3, an upper threshold of 8, and a crossover of 5. Table 3 contains the results, which unsurprisingly are identical to the results using raw coverage. The same three recipes for high coverage exist, with lower coverage and slightly higher consistency than the reported results.

TABLE 3. Intermediate FsQCA Solutions for High Newspaper Weighted Coverage with Six Causal Measures

Solution	Coverage	Consistency
RESOURCES*POLICY	0.181	0.885
AIDS*RESOURCES*inclusive	0.073	0.946
AIDS*DEATHS*PROTEST*INCLUSIVE	0.035	0.883
Overall	0.289	0.900

5. Alternative Frequency Threshold

To ensure uncommon configurations were not skewing our results, we removed rows of the truth table with fewer than 5 cases and reran our analysis. These rows become "remainder" rows along with rows with no cases and are still eligible to help reduce pathways in the intermediate solution. The results are identical to our final results, as the reduction algorithm pulled the rows we had removed from the pool of remainder rows and used them to simplify the causal recipes. Thus this robustness check upholds the initial results.

6. Alternative Consistency Threshold

We also ran analyses lowering the consistency threshold to be marked as having the outcome in the truth table from 0.8 to 0.75. We ran analyses using frequency thresholds of both 1 and 5. The results are identical to the reported results, as a consistency gap exists in the truth table between 0.83 and 0.58, so picking any consistency score within this gap will result in identical rows being coded with the outcome.

7. Removing Inactive Organizations

Although inactive organizations are still capable of being covered, as sometimes newspapers mention early yet defunct gay rights organizations during such events as pride month, we ran an analysis without inactive organizations to ensure that they were not having an undue influence on the results. Table 4 contains the results of this analysis, and shows that they have no real influence. The recipes are identical to the original results, with only slightly different coverage scores.

Table 4. Intermediate FsQCA Solutions for High Newspaper Coverage with Six Causal Measures with Inactive Organizations Removed

Solution	Coverage	Consistency
RESOURCES*POLICY	0.241	0.903
AIDS*RESOURCES*inclusive	0.091	0.905
AIDS*DEATHS*PROTEST*INCLUSIVE	0.042	0.833
Overall	0.374	0.895

8. Adjusted Twenty-First Century Calibrations

To account for the fact that newspapers have lost significant advertising revenue and have had to cut back on newsroom staff in recent years, we altered the calibrations for high coverage for years 2000-2010. For these years, the outcome set was calibrated with 2 as the lower threshold, 6 as the upper threshold, and 4 as the crossover. Table 5 contains the results of this analysis. Again, the recipes are identical to the original ones, though with slightly lower coverage and slightly higher consistency.

Table 5. Intermediate FsQCA Solutions for High Newspaper Coverage with Six Causal Measures and Adjusted 21st Century Outcome Calibrations

Solution	Coverage	Consistency
RESOURCES*POLICY	0.225	0.924
AIDS*RESOURCES*inclusive	0.088	0.959
AIDS*DEATHS*PROTEST*INCLUSIVE	0.041	0.867
Overall	0.354	0.925

9. Expanded Definition of Crisis

Scholars theorize about the impact of crises, but usually do not define them very well. Perhaps in the social movement literature the most common definition is Walsh's (1981) "suddenly imposed grievances" one, based on a nuclear accident, which disrupt a community's routines or threaten its existence. We also relied on the discussion of Molotch and Lester (1975) about the influence of crises on news coverage. Like them, we employ a fairly strict definition of crises. Along with the outbreak of deadly diseases, we consider wars, massive unemployment, and major natural and man-made disasters as crises. We did not include the anti-same-sex marriage campaign beginning in 2004 as a crisis, as it did not represent the same sort of existential threat as the AIDS epidemic, which led to many thousands of deaths and was also a major public health disaster. By contrast, the anti-gay marriage laws and referendums being passed were mainly solidifying an anti-marriage-equality political status quo, as the Defense of Marriage Act had already codified this discrimination in national law. Moreover, we hypothesize the impact of policy change?positive and negative?on the

attention to organizations, and this negative policy change squarely fits our conceptualization of that, and is incorporated in our measure. However, as a robustness check we model the years 2004 through 2006 as a crisis. We construct a new crisis measure which is the union (logical OR) of the Deaths measure from the paper and this same-sex marriage crisis measure which is coded 1 for years 2004-2006. Table 6 contains these results. The causal recipes are identical to those reported in the paper, and the coverage and consistency scores are slightly lower. The expanded crisis measure only captures the AIDS context, and does not offer an alternative pathway during the same-sex marriage setbacks of the mid oughts.

TABLE 6. Intermediate FsQCA Solutions for High Newspaper Coverage with Six Causal Measures and Expanded Measure of Crisis

Solution	Coverage	Consistency
RESOURCES*POLICY	0.233	0.903
AIDS*RESOURCES*inclusive	0.088	0.905
AIDS*CRISIS*PROTEST*INCLUSIVE	0.044	0.805
Overall	0.365	0.891

10. Regression Results

We performed negative binomial regression analysis of coverage of LGBT movement organizations. Each case was an SMO-year. The dependent variable was the number of articles the SMO appeared in for a particular year. We included our six causal measures and seven additional control variables. AIDS Policy Focus is a dummy variable for those organizations that focused on AIDS related policy. AIDS Deaths is the number of deaths due to AIDS per year, logged with base 2. Thus, a one unit increase in this variable indicates a doubling of the number of deaths. Inclusive Identity is a dummy variable for those organizations with a broader, inclusive identity. Protest Tactics is a dummy variable for those organizations that engage in disruptive protest as part of its tactical repertoire. Large SMO is a dummy variable for organizations with over a million dollar budget, or equivalent staff or membership numbers. Policy Score is the cumulative policy score for the policy focus of the SMO in a particular year.

For the control variables, we included Active LGBT SMOs, the number of national LGBT SMOs currently active. Democratic President is a dummy variable for years in which there was a Democrat in the White House. Liberal House is based on DWNOMINATE scores, multiplied by negative one hundred so that higher values are more liberal. Countermovement Coverage is the yearly number articles mentioning a national anti-gay countermovement organization. Centralized Organization is a dummy variable for organizations that have a strong national office as opposed to more distributed chapters. Assertive is a dummy variable for organizations that engage in assertive type political action. Finally, Radical Ideology is a dummy variable for those organizations with a radical ideology.

Using Stata 12's xtnbreg command, we ran negative binomial regressions with random effects. Table 7 contains the results of two regressions, one with just main effects and a second with three interactions based on our hypotheses.

Of our independent variables, three were significant in the main effects regression. An increase in AIDS deaths predicted an increase in coverage- roughly a seven percent increase in coverage each time AIDS deaths double. SMOs that used protest tactics received half the coverage of other SMOs, on average. Well resourced organizations receive about 60 percent more coverage than non-well resourced organizations. Three control variables were also significant. A liberal House predicted an increase in coverage, though the effect size is small. An increase in countermovement coverage also predicted an increase in coverage, though the effect size was small here as well. Finally, organizations with a radical ideology had over twice the media coverage than non-radical organizations, on average.

Our hypotheses are not about the net effects of these measures, but, instead, how these measures combine to produce coverage. To capture these combinatorial relationships, we ran a second regression including three interaction effects based on our hypotheses. First, since we expect policy success to primarily benefit those organizations with the resources to take advantage of the success, we include an interaction between the large SMO measure and the policy score measure. Second, since we expect the AIDS crisis to drive coverage primarily for those organizations focused on the AIDS epidemic, we include an interaction of AIDS Policy

TABLE 7. Negative Binomial Regression of Coverage Counts by Organization on Select Independent Measures

	COVERAGE	
	1	2
AIDS Policy Focus	0.0596	−8.976***
	(.211)	(1.386)
Inclusive Identity	−.029	−.106
	(.179)	(.196)
AIDS Deaths, logged	.070***	.105***
	(.017)	(.019)
Protest Tactics	−.644***	0.892***
	(.240)	(.357)
Large SMO	.484***	−.006
	(.112)	(.131)
Policy Score	.000	−.005
	(.003)	(.003)
Active LGBT SMOs	−.012	−.019**
	(.009)	(.009)
Democratic President	.068	.016
	(.073)	(.072)
Liberal House	−.070***	−.050***
	(.010)	(.010)
Countermovement Coverage	.002***	−0.001**
	(.000)	(.000)
Centralized Organization	−.138	−.207
	(.185)	(.189)
Assertive Tactics	−.098	−.184
	(.176)	(.186)
Radical Ideology	.764**	.594
	(.366)	(.387)
Large SMO X Policy Score		−.019***
		(.003)
AIDS Focus X AIDS Deaths		.670***
		(.094)
Protest X AIDS Deaths		−.112***
		(.020)
Constant	−.718***	−.753***
	(.178)	(.176)
Observations	2,326	2,326
Log Likelihood	−2828	−2765
Notes:	*P < .05; **P < .01;***P < .001	

Focus and AIDS Deaths. Third, since we expect protest organizations to gain a foothold in coverage during times of crisis, we include an interaction of Protest Tactics with AIDS Deaths.

The coefficients for this regression is presented in Table 7 under model 2. The interactions bring out the significance of several variables. AIDS Policy Focus is significant, though the main effect is negative and large, likely due to the fact that no AIDS Policy Focused organizations received coverage prior to the AIDS epidemic. Coupling AIDS Policy Focus with the AIDS Deaths interaction, the net effect of AIDS Policy Focus becomes positive at a logged deaths value of around 13.4, or nearly 11,000 AIDS Deaths. The net effect of AIDS Deaths for organizations focused on AIDS is 0.67 higher than organizations that do not focus primarily on AIDS. While the main effect of Policy Score is not significant in this model, the interaction of Policy Score and Large SMO is significant and positive, supporting our hypothesis that policy advances mainly benefit large SMOs. The main effect of Protest Tactics becomes positive in the interaction model, but the interaction with AIDS Deaths is negative. The net effect of Protest Tactics becomes negative after only 250 deaths due to AIDS.

While these results do support our assertion that our independent variables combine to influence coverage, they are problematic. First, the regression suffers from multicollinearity issues, as anything that increases over time are fairly highly correlated with each other. Second, our hypotheses are asymmetrical — we expect the presence of the AIDS crisis to increase coverage for certain organizations, but we don't imply that the absence of the crisis suppresses coverage. Regression analysis implies symmetrical relationships, which likely explains some of the weird directional relationships in the interaction model. Finally, our hypotheses involve the combination of three measures leading to coverage, however including three way interactions in regressions is tricky as interactions often suffer from collinearity issues, and three way interactions are difficult to interpret. For this reason, we use fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to analyze when organizations receive high coverage. These results are presented in the paper.

Since liberal House and countermovement coverage were consistently significant over the two models, we tried using these measures in the fsQCA. They did not improve the results, however, and so we do not use them.

References

Andrews, K. T. and N. Caren (2010). Making the news: Movement organizations, media attention, and the public agenda. *American Sociological Review 75*(6), 841–866.

Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones (2012). Policy agendas project.

HRC (2006). Timeline: The courts and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender rights.

HRC (2009). State hate crimes laws.

Kane, M. (2003). Social movement policy success: Decriminalizing state sodomy laws, 1969-1998. *Mobilization: An International Journal 8*(3), 313–334.

Kane, M. (2007). Timing matters: Shifts in the causal determinants of sodomy law decriminalization, 1961-1998. *Social Problems 54*(2), 211–239.

Kranz, R. and T. Cusick (2005). *Gay Rights*. New York City: Facts on File, Inc.

Molotch, H. and M. Lester (1975). Accidental news: The great oil spill as local occurrence and national event. *American Journal of Sociology 81*(2), 235–260.

NGLTF (2009). Hate crime laws in the us.

NGLTF (2012). State nondiscrimination laws in the u.s.

Pinello, D. R. (2003). *Gay Rights and American Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ragin, C. C. (2008). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: fuzzy sets and beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Walsh, E. J. (1981). Resource mobilization and citizen protest in communities around three mile island. *Social Problems 29*(1), 1–21.